Cruise Report 64-S-4 Bottomfish

(PDF contains 4 pages.

Cruise Report 69-S-1: Bottomfish Program

(PDF contains 2 pages

Bubble, Bubble, Where's the Housing Bubble?

Discussions of whether a housing bubble exists generally rely on indirect barometers such as rapidly increasing prices, unrealistic expectations of future price increases, and rising ratios of housing price indexes to indexes of household income. Such measures cannot, however, answer the key question of whether housing prices are justified by the value of the services that a home provides. We show how to estimate the fundamental value of a home from rent data. We then apply this procedure in ten metropolitan areas, using a unique set of rent and sale price data for matched single-family homes. We do not find evidence of a bubble in most of these cities: under a variety of plausible assumptions, buying a home in these cities today still appears to be an attractive long-term investment.housing bubble, macroeconomics, bubble, house

Atlas and zoogeography of common fishes in the Bering Sea and northeastern Pacific

The geographic and depth frequency distribution of 124 common demersal fish species in the northeastern Pacific were plotted from data on me at the Northwest and Alaska Fisheries Center (NWAFC), National Marine Fisheries Service. The data included catch records of fishes and invertebrates from 24,881 samples taken from the Chukchi Sea, throughout the Bering Sea, Aleutian Basin, Aleutian Archipelago, and the Gulf of Alaska, and from southeastern Alaska south to southern California. Samples were collected by a number of agencies and institutions over a 30-year period (1953-83), but were primarily from NWAFC demersal trawls. The distributions of all species with 100 or more occurrences in the data set were plotted by computer. Distributions plotted from these data were then compared with geographic and depth-range limits given in the literature. These data provide new range extensions (geographic, depth, or both) for 114 species. Questionable extensions are noted, the depth ranges determined for 95% of occurrences, and depths of most frequent occurrence are recorded. Ranges of the species were classified zoogeographically, according to life zone, and with regard to the depth zone of greatest occurrence. Because most species examined have broad geographic ranges, they do not provide the best information for testing the validity of proposed zoogeographic province boundaries. Because of the location of greatest sampling effort and methods used in sampling, most fIShes examined were eastern boreal Pacific, sublittoral-bathyal (outer shelf) species. (PDF file contains 158 pages.

FARM LEVEL IMPACTS OF THE 2002 FARM BILL ON A GEORGIA AND NORTH CAROLINA FARM

The 2002 Farm Bill eliminates the peanut quota program and establishes a marketing loan program for peanuts. A Georgia and North Carolina peanut model farm are developed to examine farm level impacts of program changes. Results indicate more revenue derived from the government and an increase in net farm income.Agricultural and Food Policy,

Political constraints on government cartelization: the case of oil production regulation in Texas and Saudi Arabia.

We examine government cartelization efforts in crude oil production. Texas and Saudi Arabia are alleged to act as swing producers to maintain the interstate (1933-1972) and OPEC (1973 on) oil cartels respectively. We analyze the political constraints that affected the ability of Texas and Saudi Arabia to act as residual producers within their respective cartels. In the case of Texas, political factors molded individual firm production quotas, advantaging high-cost producers and hence, reducing total cartel net profits. Further, Texas had limited range for adjusting total state production to maintain interstate output at levels consistent with target prices. Saudi Arabia’s role as swing producer within OPEC raises similar questions regarding how cartel output is shared among members, and the extent to which domestic economic and political pressures coming from various member countries may undermine the effectiveness of the cartel. OPEC ‘s coordination problem has been more difficult than that faced by the interstate cartel for a variety of reasons that we explore. Even so, they have not kept the OPEC members in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, from exerting a strong influence on the level of world oil prices.